"If there must be madness, something may be said for having it on a heroic scale."
-- John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Great Crash of 1929"
"Corporations don't tell lies; someone within the corporation lies."
-- John Coffee, Columbia Law School Professor
-- John Kenneth Galbraith, "The Great Crash of 1929"
"Corporations don't tell lies; someone within the corporation lies."
-- John Coffee, Columbia Law School Professor
On Monday, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) hit Bank of America with a (measly) $33 million penalty for paying nigh unto $6 billion of bonuses to Merrill Lynch execs in 2008.
The bailout of American banks was supposed to provide money for loans. But -- according to a report released last week by a watchdog agency overseeing the financial rescue program -- instead of boosting lending, banks have used the funds provided by the government (read: "you and me") to pay down debt or, believe it or not, buy other banks.
So today, I won't be asking you to look at the market or at a sector or a stock. Instead, I'm going to tell you a story. It's a fairly involved story, with lots of intrigue; as such I'll tell it in two parts.
It's a story with many lessons. And it's a story that is not, unfortunately, unique, in that there are others who could also be placed under a similar revealing lens (see B-of-A mention above).
Today we're going to turn our attention to Part 1 of "A Wall Street Saga." Today's installment is "A 'Goldman' Opportunity."
Let's Start at the Very Beginning ...
In 1869, a German immigrant named Marcus Goldman, along with his son-in-law Samuel Sachs, founded a company that led the way in propagating the use of commercial paper.
In other words, they loaned short-term IOUs to small businesses (vendors, really) in New York City. The company’s name, as you’ve probably guessed, is Goldman Sachs.
There are many interesting things about the history of Goldman Sachs that are worth knowing about:
The bailout of American banks was supposed to provide money for loans. But -- according to a report released last week by a watchdog agency overseeing the financial rescue program -- instead of boosting lending, banks have used the funds provided by the government (read: "you and me") to pay down debt or, believe it or not, buy other banks.
So today, I won't be asking you to look at the market or at a sector or a stock. Instead, I'm going to tell you a story. It's a fairly involved story, with lots of intrigue; as such I'll tell it in two parts.
It's a story with many lessons. And it's a story that is not, unfortunately, unique, in that there are others who could also be placed under a similar revealing lens (see B-of-A mention above).
Today we're going to turn our attention to Part 1 of "A Wall Street Saga." Today's installment is "A 'Goldman' Opportunity."
Let's Start at the Very Beginning ...
In 1869, a German immigrant named Marcus Goldman, along with his son-in-law Samuel Sachs, founded a company that led the way in propagating the use of commercial paper.
In other words, they loaned short-term IOUs to small businesses (vendors, really) in New York City. The company’s name, as you’ve probably guessed, is Goldman Sachs.
There are many interesting things about the history of Goldman Sachs that are worth knowing about:
- The investment trust game it played during the Great Depression.
- Its pioneering role in the introduction of IPOs, the firm’s adoption of the ethical mantra “long-term greedy” in the '70s and '80s.
- Robert Rubin’s relaxing of financial-market regulations that led to the complete disregard for underwriting standards (established in the '30s) and the subsequent dot-com bust (because only "insiders" knew about the changing of the rules, investors were left out in the cold).
- Its practice of laddering while introducing Internet IPOs, for which it paid a paltry settlement of $40 million in 2005 (Google “Nicholas Maier” and “Jim Cramer” -- yes, that Jim Cramer, a former GS employee) and its practice of spinning, which earned it another meager settlement of $110 million, prompted by a 2002 House Financial Services Committee report. (Google GS and “special stock offerings,” along with eBay and Enron).
Between 1999 and 2002, GS paid an average of $7 billion a year in comps and "bennies," about $350,000 a year per employee.
Now last year, during the financial crisis with which we all have become intimately acquainted (through no desire of our own), Goldman Sachs Group Inc. became a bank holding company (BHC).
The trouble is, after more than half a year as a BHC, several analysts at CreditSights (an independent fixed-income research firm) have noted that Goldman is still "not reporting like a bank and not acting like one, either."
In a note to investors after the latest earnings report, they wrote, “The company has basically been given a green light to continue operating in a 'business as usual' fashion.” In fact, at the end of 2008, CEO Lloyd Blankfein reiterated that the firm would continue "to be an adviser, financier, co-investor and asset manager." No talk of ATMs there, is there?
With more banks continuing to fail, regulators have their hands full and are apparently ignoring Goldman’s unchanging behavior. For instance, say the analysts, the firm doesn't disclose a full balance sheet in its earnings release.
Hmm.
The 'Thought Plickens'
Goldman was a big player in the bundling of mortgages into Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), which mixed the good with the bad (and garnered its AAA rating). Companies like AIG provided the insurance on the CDOs in an instrument known as credit-default swaps.
Old news, I know.
Now, I'm not a conspiracy-theorist sort. I am a rationalist, and most conspiracy theories seem to me to be a linking of disparate facts by coincidence in the fashion of "The Da Vinci Code." But I started to wonder just how far Goldman Sachs' influence spread, and by what means.
I first found out that back in 2000, AIG asked the New York State Insurance Department (NYSID) whether default swaps would be regulated as insurance. The head of the NYSID ruled that swaps were not to be regulated. This was Neil Levin, a former Goldman Sachs V.P.
Now, we all know that Henry Paulson was a former GS CEO, and that former Clinton administration Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin was a 26-year veteran of the company. But the list goes on:
- John Thain of Merrill Lynch ("who bought an $87,000 area rug for his office as his company was imploding")
- Robert Steel of Wachovia (received $225 million as Wachovia disintegrated, only to rise from the ashes as a Wells Fargo subsidiary)
- Joshua Bolten, GW's chief of staff, and Mark Patterson, Obama's Treasury chief of staff (former GS lobbyists)
- Ed Liddy, former GS director placed in charge of AIG by Paulson
There, of course, are more. But you get the picture.
Something you may not have known, however, is that -- in addition to the $10 billion in TARP funds that GS recently paid back to the government -- it received $13 billion from AIG when Liddy was put in charge.
"By the peak of the housing boom in 2006, Goldman was underwriting $76.5 billion worth of mortgage-backed securities -- a third of which were subprime. ... But even as it was doing so, it was taking short positions in the same market ... and that net short position was profitable."
So Goldman was hedging its bets, and making more money doing so than from the mortgage CDOs themselves.
Is there no justice?
Well, of course there is. Sort of.
Lawsuits came. Some are still there. Massachusetts won a humungous settlement from GS of $60 million.
Black Gold, Texas Tea
Where to go?
Well, as Barbara Cohen has so poignantly pointed out in her Monday columns in The Tycoon Report, futures can make a world of difference in the market.
We saw what happened to the price of oil in the last year, even though production was increasing while demand was decreasing. (A classic scenario for a reduction in the price of a commodity. Even now, we're at a 20-year high in supply and a 10-year low in demand.)
How did we get here? Guess who had a dipstick in the oil tank. ...
Goldman Sachs got big, big investors to start buying oil futures, transforming the commodity into a gambler's dream. No longer dependent upon supply and demand, by 2008, "a barrel of oil was traded 27 times, on average, before it was actually delivered and consumed. ...
"(I)n fact, commodities speculators had bought and stockpiled enough oil futures to fill 1.1 billion barrels of crude, which meant that (they) owned more future oil on paper than there was real, physical oil stored in all of the country's commercial storage tanks and the Strategic Petroleum Reserve combined."
(Google "Bona Fide Hedging exemption" for more insight into GS' dealings with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the body that tried and failed to regulate credit-default swaps.)
That's enough to chew on for this week, but the best on this topic is yet to come. Next week, we'll talk about how Goldman Sachs gets its grubby little fingers into taxpayer money, global warming, and programmed trading.
The Only Things Certain are Death and ... WHAT?!!?
If you said "taxes," you must not be at Goldman Sachs! Check out this timeline of events:
September 2008: Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson chooses to let Lehman Brothers fail. By doing so, he eliminates Goldman Sachs' last real competitor.
The Next Day: Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson bails out AIG. AIG hands over $13 billion of the received funds to Goldman in repayment of debt owed.
Shortly Thereafter: Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson implements the Troubled Asset Relief Program, a $700 billion federal bailout for the financial industry, placing Neel Kashkari, a 35-year-old Goldman banker, in charge of administering the funds.
In the Wink of an Eye: POOF! Goldman transforms from an investment bank into a bank-holding company and gets $10 billion in TARP monies.
Same Day: Since the transformation, Goldman is now supervised by the New York Federal Reserve, headed by Stephen Friedman, former co-chair of GS. (He got a conflict-of-interest waiver, which made him big bucks because he not only didn't have to divest himself of GS stock, but he also bought 52,000 more shares.) He leaves the Fed in May 2009.
Current Day: William Dudley is now the N.Y. Fed president, a former -- surprise! -- Goldman Sachs fellow. And GS is back to its old tricks, moving up its earnings report calendar to effectively wipe out December of last year ($1.3 billion loss) and reporting a $1.8 billion Q1 profit, partly due to the AIG bailout money. That, remember, is money that you and I paid.
Goldman Sachs paid out $10 billion in comps and "bennies" in 2008 and made over $2 billion in profit.
It paid 1% in taxes in 2008. An incomprehensibly insignificant $14 million.
According to Matt Taibbi, "The low taxes are due in large part to changes in the bank's 'geographic earnings mix.' In other words, the bank moved its money around so that most of its earnings took place in foreign countries with low tax rates. ... A GAO report, in fact, found that between 1998 and 2005, roughly two-thirds of all corporations in the U.S. paid no taxes at all."
Cap'n (Trade) Crunch
There's a Democrat in the White House. Regardless of your political leanings, it's hard to escape the fact that around $981,000 was given to Barack Obama's campaign by Goldman Sachs employees. Or the fact that many GS alumni are still in high places in government posts.
In case you missed last week's section on commodities, you can read it here. But all you really need to know is that it's déjà vu all over again.
This time it's carbon credits.
The current cap-and-trade bill in Congress is designed to allow those companies who produce greenhouse gases over a given limit for their industry to buy “credits” from those companies who were able to come in under the limits in their carbon emissions. The estimates for these auctions over the course of the first seven years ranges from $650 billion to $2 trillion.
During the past few years, Goldman Sachs has sent its lobbyists to Capitol Hill to full-court press Congress for cap-and-trade. One of these lobbyists was Mark Patterson, current Treasury chief of staff.
Why Would GS be so Environmentally Concerned?
Tabbi reports that GS “owns a 10% stake in the Chicago Climate Exchange, where the carbon credits will be traded,” as well as a portion of carbon-credit reseller Blue Source LLC. (Read about the “strategic alliance” at Ghgworks.com/2b-alliances.html.)
I consider myself an environmentalist but I, for one, am against the cap-and-trade legislation making its way through the congressional halls of D.C. I believe that the fairest and most-effective way to give companies the incentive to reduce emissions is by taxing them directly.
I’m not alone in this thought. Hedge-fund director Michael Masters said:
"If it's going to be a tax, I would prefer that Washington set the tax and collect it. But we're saying that
Wall Street can set the tax, and Wall Street can collect the tax. That's the last thing in the world I want.
It's just asinine.”
A Man's Reach Should Exceed His Grasp, or What's a Market For?
The market is designed for good, worthwhile and well-managed companies to rise to the top and for companies with bad ideas, insufficient capital or poor execution to sink to the bottom. Money goes to the productive and shies away from the ineffective.
Conventional wisdom says that the market is just too big to be manipulated. I’m beginning to question the conventional wisdom.
Super-fast computers make trades in milliseconds. They can buy and sell hundreds of securities while you’re still reaching for the “Enter” key.
Honestly, I’m not sure what value they add to the market, other than the efficiencies and excessive profits they grant their owners.
Goldman Sachs admits that it profits from HFT, High-Frequency Trading, but it refuses to admit the possibility that this might give them an unfair advantage over those without such advanced computers, including you and me.
Here’s one example of how it could.
I know that, to ensure transparency, orders issued by an exchange are supposed to arrive simultaneously, so that everyone sees them at the same time. Enter the loophole: Some marketplaces (e.g., the Nasdaq) that pay a fee can receive the orders ahead of everybody else.
To put it simply, investment banks like Goldman Sachs are able, with these super-fast computers, “to front-run the rest of the market by determining investors’ sentiments by virtue of being able to examine incoming orders and estimate the upper limit of how much the market traders (a)re willing to pay for shares”.
Can anyone tell me what this ability to quickly make has to do with developing a analytical investment strategy or with improving liquidity in the market?
The Final Straw
On July 3, Sergey Alynikov, who used to program these supercomputers for Goldman Sachs, was arrested in Newark, New Jersey. He was charged with allegedly stealing the software code for GS’ proprietary trading program.
According to an article by David Glovin published on Bloomberg.com, “The prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney Joseph Facciponti, was quoted as telling the court: ‘The bank has raised the possibility that there is a danger that somebody who knew how to use this program could use it to manipulate markets in unfair ways.’ “
If someone else could use the program to manipulate the markets in unfair ways, why is it assumed that Goldman Sachs would do no such thing?
I think you already know what I think.